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Abstract 
Students of institutions have 
identified a pattern of ―serial 
replacement,‖ distinctive of Latin 
American countries in which 
institutional change has become 
frequent as well as radical. Patterns 
of serial replacement underlie well-
known ―traps‖ of de-
institutionalization: military coups 
beget more coups, democratic 
breakdowns make breakdowns more 
likely, constitutional replacements 
encourage the adoption of new 
constitutions, inter-branch conflicts 
feed further conflicts, and so on. In 
this paper we develop a theory of 
serial replacement and apply it to 
explain cycles of judicial instability 
in 18 Latin American countries. 
Using a novel dataset covering more 
than 3,000 Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Tribunal justices 
between 1900 and 2010, we show 
that political attempts to reshuffle 
Supreme Courts and Constitutional 
Tribunals encourage new attempts 
to reshuffle the high courts in later 
years, creating a sequential pattern 
of judicial instability. 
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Why do some societies experience traumatic events repeatedly, while 
others never undergo such incidents? How can the literature on serial events 
illuminate the study of judicial politics? We argue that political purges of 
Supreme Courts and Constitutional Tribunals follow a recursive pattern already 
described by students of other phenomena in political science. The reshuffle of a 
high court can be a costly endeavor, provoking strong legal and political 
responses against the rulers attempting it. However, purges have become a 
common practice in certain countries, with serious consequences for democracy 
over the long run (Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013). We analyze the factors 
that account for such cycles of judicial instability.  
Scholars in several fields have documented political processes following a 
recursive pattern. The literature in International Relations has identified 
enduring rivalries that yield recurrent interstate militarized disputes (Gartzke 
and Simon 1999; Gochman and Maoz 1984; Goertz and Diehl 1993) as well as 
intermittent civil wars within the same country (Collier and Sambanis 2002; 
Mattes and Savun 2010; Walter 2004). In Comparative Politics, scholars have 
analyzed why some countries experience repeated military coups (Hiroi and 
Omori 2013; Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2014; Londregan and Poole 1990), regime 
breakdowns (Przeworski 2009; Przeworski et al. 2000), or institutional changes 
(Levitsky and Murillo 2013; Negretto 2012). And in American Politics, academics 
have studied the recurrent adoption of obscenity legislation at the state level 
(Jones and Branton 2006).  
Even though there is scant research addressing the recurrence of purges in 
high courts (Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich 2013; Helmke 2005; Helmke 
and Staton 2011), the literature in other fields can contribute to develop a 
theoretical framework to study this phenomenon. Judicial instability in 
developing countries has been long acknowledged, but only in recent years 
scholars have started to study its causes (Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich 
2013; Castagnola 2012; Lara Borges, Castagnola, and Pérez-Liñán 2012; Leiras et 
al. 2011; Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2009).  
In the first section of this paper we introduce the concept of serial events 
and show that this category can be applied fruitfully to the study of judicial 
reshuffles. The second section discusses two mechanisms typically invoked to 
account for recursive events and extends their logic to the study of judicial 
instability. We operationalize these mechanisms and test their impact using a 
sample of high court justices in 18 Latin American countries between 1900 and 
2010 in section three. The conclusions underscore that historical legacies pose a 
heavy burden for legal institutions, but also explain why legacies are not 
inescapable. 
 
Serial Events and Judicial Turnover 
We define serial events as recurrent contests to reallocate power among 
political actors, which produce cyclical disruptions of the status-quo. In line with 
this definition, Goertz and Diehl (1993) operationalize enduring rivalries by 
looking at three features of international disputes: competitiveness, duration 
(time), and spatial consistency. According to Goertz and Diehl, recurrent 
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disputes reveal that actors are engaged in a competition over a scarce good. 
Whether the good is tangible (e.g., land) or intangible (religious dominance), the 
struggle has distributive implications for the power resources of all parties 
involved. This feature is common to other manifestations of serial events. The 
literature on ―coup traps‖ has underscored the implications of repeated military 
rebellions for domestic actors struggling to control the political regime 
(Londregan and Poole 1990), while the literature on serial institutional 
replacement has emphasized the distributive consequences of new constitutional 
designs for political parties seeking to control the government (Negretto 2013).  
Temporal persistence is central to the definition of serial events because 
redistributive struggles manifest themselves recursively. Persistence, however, 
evades a unanimous operationalization. Students of militarized disputes have 
argued that conflicts should recur for more than few years to claim a rivalry 
qualifies as ―enduring‖ (Goertz and Diehl 1993). Adding to the complexity of this 
issue, the recurrence of serial events implies that manifest struggles are 
intermittent, while the latent conditions that give them an identity are 
persistent.   
The requirement of spatial consistency often transcends its geographic 
connotation to refer to the identity of players. In international affairs, it 
typically refers to the stability of state dyads engaged in recurrent conflict 
(Gochman and Maoz 1984). For students of domestic affairs, an extended 
interpretation of this principle implies the persistence of actors involved in civil 
war (Mattes and Savun 2010), or of institutions involved in inter-branch conflict 
(Helmke 2010).  
Implicit in most discussions of serial events is the assumption that these 
episodes are disruptive of a normatively desirable status-quo (e.g., peace, 
democratic stability, legal integrity). Normative considerations suggest that 
militarized interstate disputes, civil wars, military coups, inter-branch 
confrontations, or constitutional replacements are not intended to recur. By 
contrast, regular contests to reallocate power through institutionalized elections 
are considered normal politics and thus beyond this conceptualization. The 
recurrence of scheduled institutional events denotes that those events are part 
of the existing status-quo, and not a disruption of it. In these cases, the desirable 
status-quo is itself dynamic. 
In this study we focus on recurrent judicial turnover, a particular type of 
serial event that affects the stability of judges in office. Repeated turnover 
undermines the autonomy of the judiciary and the legitimacy of legal institutions 
(Castagnola and Perez-Liñán 2011; Helmke 2005; Helmke and Staton 2011). 
Occasional reshuffles of the Supreme Court or Constitutional Tribunal may be 
necessary to replace judges tainted by corruption or linked to an authoritarian 
regime, and the reorganization of high courts is not uncommon during 
democratic transitions (Domingo 2000). However, a history of serial turnover 
indicates that the high courts in a country are repeatedly subject to political 
attacks. A pattern of serial turnover is arguably sufficient to thwart judicial 
independence, for every major political realignment is likely to trigger a new 
reconstitution of the judicial hierarchy. 
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Persistent reshuffles of high courts meet the defining features of serial 
events. The cyclical disruption of the institutional order is marked by multiple 
purges of the Supreme Court or Constitutional Tribunal. These purges reveal an 
ongoing battle among partisan players to secure political dominance over the 
judiciary. Political competition involves a tangible good, the seats in the high 
courts, with the outcome of each contest producing a redistribution of the power 
to exercise judicial review and influence legal outcomes in the lower courts.  
To illustrate the incidence of serial reshuffles in the Western Hemisphere, 
Figure 1 depicts the proportion of Supreme Court judges leaving the post in any 
given year between 1900 and 2010 in eighteen Latin American countries (we also 
include the United States and Puerto Rico for reference). A majority of the 
justices never left the Supreme Court simultaneously in the United States, Puerto 
Rico, or Brazil. Reshuffles took place only once in Chile, three times in Costa 
Rica, and five times in Uruguay. By contrast, they occurred 26 times in El 
Salvador, 23 times in Honduras, Guatemala, and Paraguay, and 22 times in 
Bolivia. While the probability of a Supreme Court Justice leaving office in a 
typical year was about 6 percent in the United States, 7 percent in Puerto Rico, 
and 9 percent and Brazil and Costa Rica, it reached 24 percent in Bolivia, El 
Salvador, and Honduras. Therefore, the expected tenure for a justice is twelve 
years on average in Costa Rica but barely four years in Bolivia. 
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Figure 1. Supreme Courts: Exit Rates per Year, 1900-2010 
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Accounting for Serial Events 
 Explanations of serial events invoke two alternative logics: they assert the 
presence of steady factors that create a high (but static) probability of disruptive 
events, or they postulate the presence of an increasing-return process by which 
the risk of disruptive events rises (dynamically) with the frequency of past events 
(Page 2006). This theoretical distinction is akin to the difference between frailty 
and conditional gap time models in event-history analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004). The two explanations are not incompatible and they often coexist in 
the literature, but they have different policy implications. In the first case, 
disruptive events are expected to recur until the underlying risk factors are 
suppressed, while in the second case the likelihood of disruptive events is 
expected to rise until a termination mechanism breaks the cumulative trap.   
 
Latent Conditions 
The notion of ―enduring rivalries‖ in international affairs constitutes a 
classic example of the first group of explanations (Gartzke and Simon 1999). 
Scholars typically argue that, as far as the conditions that originated the first 
militarized dispute remain unchanged, war is likely to recur (Goertz and Diehl 
1993). For example, if the preferences of international actors and their power 
relations remain the same, rational players will return to the same equilibrium 
behavior. Structuralist scholars similarly argue that if system structures do not 
change, the same outcomes are likely to re-appear over time (Deutsch and Singer 
1964). Explaining the recurrence of civil wars, Walter claims that ―civilians are 
not going to transform themselves from shopkeepers back into soldiers unless the 
conditions that exist at any given point in time encourage this transformation‖ 
(Walter 2004: 374, italics in original).  
Within the Comparative Politics literature, Levitsky and Murillo (2013) 
focus on recurrent (and radical) institutional change in Latin America. The 
authors claim that institutions born weak are unlikely to endure. Institutional 
weakness results from high uncertainty about the distribution of power at the 
time of institutional adoption, as well as from a disjuncture between the goals of 
legislators and those of de facto power holders. Such initial conditions, in turn, 
are fostered by latent factors such as frequent regime instability, electoral 
volatility, and social inequality, and partially compensated by circumstances that 
allow for selective enforcement and reduce the risk of institutional 
displacement. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) similarly explain recurrent coups in 
unconsolidated democracies as the result of a cycle in which elites concede 
democracy when revolution is likely and overthrow democracy when a coup 
becomes viable. When the cost of revolting is low for the poor, elites agree to 
democratize the system and redistribute income. Yet, when exogenous factors 
reduce the cost of a coup, elites overthrow the regime and reestablish income 
inequality. Democratization returns when exogenous conditions reduce, once 
again, the cost of revolution for the excluded; but anticipating another coup, the 
median voter redistributes income promptly, re-igniting the cycle (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006, 242-243). In this account, serial events are driven by a latent 
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condition (inequality) that makes redistribution costly for elites, combined with 
random exogenous shifts in the cost of revolutions and coups. 
 
Legacies and Increasing Risk 
 The second group of explanations emphasizes a dynamic understanding of 
recurrent events in which the risk of failure is conditional on a previous history. 
Under this interpretation, the baseline hazard rate is not the same for all events. 
The assumption underpinning this approach is that events are dependent from 
one another, meaning that previous episodes have a significant role in explaining 
the occurrence of future ones and, therefore, that cases with a prior history of 
disruptive struggles are more likely to experience the same event again (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002; Hiroi and Omori 
2013). 
An example of this perspective is offered by Hensel (1994; 1995), for 
whom countries with a longer history of interstate conflict are more likely to 
experience new confrontations. Studies concerned with the so-called ―coup trap‖ 
provide another instance of this type of research. The literature has claimed that 
societies with a past history of violent seizures of power are more likely to 
experience military coups (Londregan and Poole 1990; Putnam 1967) and that the 
frequency of democratic breakdowns in the past helps explain the likelihood of 
regime instability in the future (Przeworski 2009).  
Given these two perspectives, the end of recurrent events can be 
explained either by a transformation of the existing situation underpinning the 
conflict, or by an episode that breaks the connection of future events with the 
past. For example, Walter (2004) notes that, according to the literature on civil 
war, conflicts involving strong identities or extreme objectives are more likely to 
recur, but long or expensive wars, as well as those that produce a decisive 
military victory, are less likely to trigger a sequel (Gurr 2000; Kaufmann 1996; 
Rothchild and Groth 1995; Wagner 1994). Explanations for the end of cyclical 
armed conflicts are often cast in terms of solutions to underlying commitment 
problems and information asymmetries (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Mattes and 
Savun 2010). Similarly, in Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) account of 
unconsolidated democracies, the cycle of political instability is hard to break 
because elites cannot commit to respect democracy, and the median voter 
cannot credibly commit to moderate redistribution. The literature on military 
coups has argued that the establishment of free elections plays a critical role in 
accounting for the end of recurrent political instability, because greater political 
competition reduces incentives to destabilize the new regime for the losing side 
of the previous coup (Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2014). 
 
Cycles of Judicial Instability 
Both perspectives are potentially relevant to explain recurrent judicial 
turnover. The first perspective suggests that contexts of political turmoil—e.g., 
unstable regimes or short-lived constitutions—will intermittently empower 
politicians to take extraordinary actions and facilitate the reshuffling of high 
courts.  The reason why politicians, and especially executives, want to craft a 
Perspectivas Revista de Ciencias Sociales - ISSN 2525-1112|Año 2 No. 4 Julio-Diciembre 2017, pp. 74-94  
81 
friendly court is straightforward: justices are powerful veto players with capacity 
to undermine the government’s policy agenda, and thus enhance or diminish the 
power of an administration (Helmke and Staton 2011). Unfriendly justices can 
reverse policies or alter the distribution of partisan power within formal 
institutions. In contexts of institutional turmoil, where politicians’ horizons are 
short and extraordinary actions are granted, leaders will often take advantage of 
the situation to craft loyal courts.  
Not surprisingly, some of the countries with the highest rates of judicial 
turnover in Figure 1 also have complex histories of political and institutional 
turmoil. Between 1900 and 2006, Bolivia experienced 19 coups and Honduras 
experienced 13 coups, while Costa Rica and Uruguay experienced two coups each 
in this period (Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2014).  During the twentieth century, 
Ecuador had nine different constitutions, Honduras had eight, and El Salvador 
had seven, while Chile had three (Negretto 2013).   
Notice that according to this perspective, repeated instances of judicial 
turnover are simply a manifestation of the recursive nature of institutional 
shocks such as regime changes or constitutional replacements. Thus, we 
hypothesize that 
H1. Contexts of recurrent institutional instability account for patterns of serial 
judicial turnover.  
The second perspective, by contrast, suggests that prior experiences of 
judicial instability are likely to encourage new episodes in the future. Following 
the logic outlined in other fields, we argue that countries will fall in a judicial 
instability trap, with the probability of reshuffles increasing after previous 
purges of the high courts. Judicial reshuffles erode the legitimacy of legal 
institutions, facilitating subsequent attacks, and politicize the bench, creating 
stronger incentives for additional takeovers in the future (Helmke 2005; Pérez-
Liñán 2011).  Scholars have demonstrated that the independence of the judiciary 
is not always the most preferred outcome in developing countries because 
politicians have short-term horizons and manipulation of the judiciary becomes a 
resource to retain power (Aydın 2013; Popova 2012).  Partisan loyalties have 
proven to be a relevant explanatory variable to account for judicial turnover in 
Latin American countries (Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2009). Therefore, 
governments confronting a judiciary packed by prior incumbents will have strong 
incentives to restructure the courts during their early years in office. This 
perspective can be linked to the idea of positive feedback in theories of path 
dependence and regime legacies (Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013; Pierson 
2000), since every purge of the court ends up reinforcing an increasing risk of 
further purges. 
H2. A legacy of past judicial instability accounts for recurrent patterns of 
judicial turnover.  
 
Evidence 
We explore those arguments using a dataset covering more than 3,000 
Supreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal justices in 18 Latin American 
countries between 1900 and 2010. Each observation in the dataset represents a 
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judge-year (N = 25,367). The analysis relies on a discrete-time survival model 
that estimates the risk of any judge leaving office in a given year as a function of 
contemporary political turmoil and legacies of past judicial instability, plus a 
battery of controls discussed below.  
 
Latent Conditions for Turmoil 
          If repeated instances of judicial turnover are just a reflection of recurrent 
political turmoil, controlling for contemporaneous critical events should suffice 
to account for judicial instability. We employ four indicators of latent turmoil, 
capturing the occurrence of democratic transitions, democratic breakdowns, 
constitutional replacements, and constitutional amendments affecting the 
judiciary in any given year. Presumably, regime change should have greater 
potential to disturb the courts than formal constitutional change, and full 
constitutional replacements should have greater potential to upset the judiciary 
than mere constitutional amendments.  
 
Measuring Legacies 
         Legacies of judicial instability are hard to operationalize. Studies of 
discrete events, such as militarized interstate disputes, civil wars, or military 
coups, typically assess legacies by counting the cumulative number of episodes 
over a given period (e.g., the past two decades), or by measuring the number of 
years elapsed since the last event. An equivalent strategy for judicial turnover 
would require the identification of court-level events, such as reshuffles (i.e., 
the replacement of a majority of justices in a single episode). However, recent 
experiences in Latin America suggest that counting the number of reshuffles or 
the time elapsed since the last reshuffle may not suffice to assess judicial 
instability. Governments in Argentina and Bolivia, for example, placed pressures 
on the high courts to induce the retirement of justices, without reshuffling the 
courts abruptly in any single year. The result was considerable turnover, but 
retirements were spread over several years rather than concentrated in a single 
episode.   
To account for this possibility, we measure legacies of instability by taking 
the average yearly risk of judges leaving office over a past period. Using this 
measure, for example, a score of 0.5 could indicate that all court members were 
replaced in a given year and new judges retained their posts the following year, 
or that half of the court retired every year. Because we are interested in 
assessing the consequences of legacies over the long run, we compare the effects 
of this indicator over the past decade, the past two decades, and the past four 
decades. 
Preliminary tests indicated no geometric decline in the effects of past 
instability on future turnover, thus we do not weight episodes of instability in 
recent years more than those that took place in the distant past. The formula for 
the measure of legacies confronted by court i in year t is simply     
 
 
∑
     
     
 
   , 
where E represents the number of exits from the court in any given year, N is the 
size of the court (which may vary over time), and H is the length of the history 
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(10, 20, or 40 years). The scores for the index range between 0 and .58 (for 10 
years) or .49 (for 20 and 40 years). 
 
Alternative Explanations 
        Many other conditions may explain the departure of justices from the 
Supreme Court or Constitutional Tribunal, including the completion of their 
terms, ageing, short-term political considerations, and general country 
conditions—which may be directly observable or not (Hagle 1993; Hall 2001; 
Maitra and Smyth 2005; Ward 2003).  We control for several institutional, 
partisan, and contextual explanations. Our institutional controls include a 
dichotomous indicator for judges who belong to constitutional tribunals (as 
opposed to supreme courts), another one to capture the last year of a judge’s 
term in courts without life tenure,2 and the size of the court. Partisan controls 
include dummies for a new administration coming to office over the past 24 
months, a new ruling party coming to office in the same period, whether a judge 
was appointed during the current administration, and whether the judge was 
appointed during a government of the same party. National-level conditions are 
reflected by levels of democracy, measured through the Polity IV score, per 
capita income (measured in constant 2005 US dollars), and the yearly growth rate 
of per capita GDP.3 In addition, all models include country dummies to account 
for unobservables.   
Biographic data is not available for most Latin American justices in the 
early twentieth century, so we include a cubic transformation of the time in 
office for each justice to reflect changes in the hazard rate related to age, 
health, and experience in the post (Carter and Signorino 2010). We supplement 
this strategy in one of the models by including a frailty parameter that allows the 
baseline hazard to vary randomly across judges. 
Table 1 presents the results of several discrete-time survival models 
including only the measures of latent political turmoil and the control variables. 
Our baseline Model 1.1, presented for initial reference, includes dummy 
variables for each country, to account for unobservable factors, an indicator for 
judges who belong to constitutional tribunals (as opposed to supreme courts), 
and a cubic transformation of the time in office. Entries are odds ratios, with 
values greater than one reflecting an increase in the risk of leaving the court and 
values lower than one reflecting a decline in the hazard rate.  
The results in 1.1 indicate that members of constitutional tribunals 
confront a greater risk of departure than other justices. Models 1.3 and 1.4 also 
show that this difference cannot be explained simply by differences in the length 
                                                          
2 In most cases judges can be reappointed, thus the end of the term does not guarantee an exit 
from the court 
3
 The Polity score ranges from -10, for institutionalized autocracies, to 10, for institutionalized 
democracies (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore 1990). Information on per capita income was obtained 
from the World Development Indicators for 1961-2010, and imputed retrospectively using growth 
rates for earlier years. Growth rates were obtained from several sources, including Bergés, 
FitzGerald, and Thorp (2007); Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006); Maddison (2003). 
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of their respective terms, suggesting that constitutional judges are more likely to 
be subject to political pressures.  
 
 
Table 1. Discrete-Time Models of Judicial Turnover 
 
            1.1             1.2           1.3          1.4 
 
Estimate (s.e.) Estimate (s.e.) Estimate (s.e.) Estimate (s.e.) 
Duration (years) 1.29** (0.02) 1.33** (0.02) 1.11** (0.03) 1.15** (0.03) 
Duration2 0.98** (0.00) 0.98** (0.00) 0.99** (0.00) 0.99** (0.00) 
Duration3 1.00** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 
Constitutional Tribunal 1.52** (0.11) 1.65** (0.12) 2.43** (0.22) 2.50** (0.25) 
Country effects Yes  yes  yes  Yes  
Latent Conditions         
Democratic transition 
  
2.46** (0.22) 1.90** (0.17) 1.97** (0.19) 
Democratic breakdown 
  
3.29** (0.32) 2.32** (0.23) 2.42** (0.25) 
Const. replacement 
  
2.63** (0.19) 2.43** (0.18) 2.47** (0.19) 
Const. amendment 
  
2.12** (0.16) 2.12** (0.17) 2.15** (0.18) 
Controls         
End of term 
    
2.99** (0.20) 3.06** (0.21) 
Size of the court 
    
1.03** (0.00) 1.03** (0.01) 
New administration 
    
1.33** (0.08) 1.33** (0.08) 
New ruling party 
    
1.15* (0.07) 1.15* (0.07) 
Appointed by administration 
    
0.54** (0.04) 0.53** (0.04) 
Appointed by ruling party 
    
0.86** (0.05) 0.83** (0.05) 
Polity score 
    
0.96** (0.00) 0.95** (0.00) 
Per capita GDP  
    
0.92** (0.02) 0.91** (0.02) 
Growth GDP 
    
1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.01) 
Constant 0.10** (0.01) 0.07** (0.01) 0.10** (0.01) 0.10** (0.01) 
Number of observations 25,367 25,362 25,362 25,362 
 
Note: Entries are odds ratios (standard errors). Country parameters (in all 
models) and frailty variance parameters (in Model 1.4) are omitted to save 
space.  * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
Moreover, time in office is an important proxy for the incentives to retire. 
To illustrate this point, Figure 2 depicts the expected risk of exit for members of 
Supreme Courts and Constitutional Tribunals as time goes by. The probability of 
departure stabilizes between 20 and 27 percent for any individual after seven 
years on the job, but it rises dramatically after two decades (the two types of 
courts become indistinguishable at this stage). After three decades in office, a 
Supreme Court justice is expected to retire within 21 months.     
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Figure 2. Expected Risk of Exit for Judges in Supreme Courts and 
Constitutional Tribunals 
 
Note: based on Model 1.1. Values reflect prediction for the average justice, 
holding country effects fixed for each observation. (Bands are 95% confidence 
intervals).  
 
Model 1.2 incorporates the measures of latent political turmoil, showing 
effects that are consistent with our theoretical expectations. Democratic 
transitions and breakdowns, as well as constitutional replacements and even the 
adoption of constitutional amendments that affect the judiciary, undermine the 
stability of high courts. The size of the effects is slightly reduced when we 
incorporate additional controls in Model 1.3, but the direction and significance of 
the coefficients remains unaltered. Holding all other variables at their observed 
values, the average judge in the sample experienced an increase of 10 percent in 
the risk of exit after a democratic breakdown or the adoption of a new 
constitution, 8 percent with the adoption of a constitutional amendment, and 7 
percent after a democratic transition.41  
                                                          
4 In all simulations we employ the observed-value approach, fixing predictors (except for the 
variable under analysis) to their observed values for each observation, obtaining the expected 
probability of exit for all cases, and averaging all probabilities across the sample to produce a 
point estimate. The simulations fix the variable under analysis at different values and compare 
repeated sample means to assess the effects of the predictor. This procedure creates a more 
cautious assessment of marginal effects, as log-odds are converted to probabilities before averag-
ing, and because predicted probabilities are always contained within a realistic range determined 
by the other conditions (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013). 
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Column 1.4 presents the results of a frailty estimator which allows for 
variance in the baseline hazard for each justice. Irrespective of the approach, 
the estimates for all predictors are highly consistent. The end of the term, not 
surprisingly, considerably expands the likelihood of a departure from office. So 
does the arrival of a new administration to power and the arrival of a new ruling 
party. By contrast, judges are more likely to stay in office if they have been 
nominated by the incumbent administration or by its party. Justices also enjoy 
greater stability in more democratic regimes and in more developed countries.   
Table 2 adds alternative measures of historical legacies to the 
specification of Model 1.2. In 2.1 we include the average probability of turnover 
experienced by the court over the past decade, in 2.2, the probability of 
turnover over the past two decades, and in 2.3, the probability over the past 
four decades. In all cases, the effects of legacies are large and significant, 
reflecting a sizeable increase in the risk of judicial instability as a result of a 
previous history of reshuffles. The size of the coefficient seems to peak after two 
decades, thus we keep the second indicator in model 2.4, including all controls.  
The estimates mimic the results in models 1.3 and 1.4, except that the 
coefficient for per capita income is not significant. 
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Table 2. Legacies of Judicial Instability 
 
 
            2.1             2.2            2.3           2.4 
 
Estimate (s.e.) Estimate (s.e.) Estimate (s.e.) Estimate (s.e.) 
Duration (years) 1.38** (0.03) 1.38** (0.03) 1.39** (0.03) 1.16** (0.03) 
Duration2 0.98** (0.00) 0.98** (0.00) 0.98** (0.00) 0.99** (0.00) 
Duration3 1.00** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 1.00** (0.00) 
Constitutional Tribunal 1.48** (0.11) 1.45** (0.11) 1.44** (0.11) 2.01** (0.21) 
Country effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Latent Conditions         
Democratic transition 2.41** (0.22) 2.67** (0.25) 2.79** (0.29) 2.11** (0.21) 
Democratic breakdown 3.52** (0.34) 3.95** (0.40) 4.33** (0.48) 2.73** (0.29) 
Const. replacement 2.42** (0.19) 2.45** (0.19) 2.34** (0.20) 2.31** (0.19) 
Const. amendment 2.14** (0.17) 2.09** (0.17) 2.16** (0.18) 2.09** (0.17) 
Legacies         
Turnover, past decade 8.06** (1.89) 
      
Turnover, past 2 decades 
  
14.40** (4.39) 
  
10.46** (3.33) 
Turnover, past 4 decades 
    
9.62** (3.79) 
  
Controls         
End of term 
      
2.80** (0.20) 
Size of the court 
      
1.02** (0.01) 
New administration 
      
1.37** (0.09) 
New ruling party 
      
1.19* (0.08) 
Appointed by administration 
      
0.55** (0.04) 
Appointed by ruling party 
      
0.84** (0.05) 
Polity score 
      
0.95** (0.00) 
Per capita GDP  
      
1.01 (0.02) 
Growth GDP 
      
1.00 (0.01) 
Constant 0.04** (0.00) 0.03** (0.00) 0.04** (0.01) 0.05** (0.01) 
Number of observations 23,813 22,362 19,193 22,362 
 
Note: Entries are odds ratios (standard errors). Country parameters are omitted 
to save space.   
* p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
To provide a realistic assessment of the very large hazard ratios depicted 
for historical legacies in Table 2, Figure 3 presents the expected probability of 
turnover for judges after a new administration takes office. Values are computed 
for different legacies; for example, a score of .25 indicates that a quarter of the 
court has left office, on average, every year over the past two decades (or that 
the court was sacked every four years), while a value of .50 reflects that half of 
the court was displaced, on average, every year (or that the court was reshuffled 
every two years).  Figure 3 suggests that changes in the executive branch may 
affect the judiciary, but a prior history of reshuffles makes a considerable 
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difference. In a country with strong legacies of instability, the arrival of a new 
president to office is expected to displace about a quarter of the Court, but 
judicial turnover is also likely to ensue throughout the administration.   
 
Figure 3. Effects of a New Administration, Controlling for Different Legacies
 
Note: based on Model 2.4. Values reflect prediction for the average justice in the 
sample, holding other variables at their observed values. (Bands are 95% 
confidence intervals).  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The literature on Comparative Politics and International Relations has 
identified multiple examples of serial events, recurrent contests intended to 
produce a redistribution of power in a given territory. Militarized conflicts, civil 
wars, military coups, and institutional change, among other processes, seem to 
follow this pattern. We have shown that judicial turnover is also an instance of 
serial recurrence: the reshuffle of high courts rarely happens in isolation, and 
countries that engage in this behavior once are likely to repeat it in the future. 
Many explanations of serial events remain ambiguous with regard to the 
underlying mechanisms that produce this recurrence. In some accounts, latent 
conditions produce a high probability of an event in some cases but not others, 
and repetition rates are just a manifestation of different underlying Bernoulli 
processes. In other accounts, recurrence is the product of a self-reinforcing 
mechanism and different repetition rates result, so to speak, from alternative 
realizations of the same Polya process.  
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We have documented that both approaches are useful to understand 
judicial turnover. Countries with a high risk of regime turmoil or constitutional 
change will be exposed to high rates of judicial replacements over the long run. 
Yet, court reshuffles also create a greater risk of new events in the future, for as 
long as two decades and maybe much longer. The reasons for these enduring 
legacies may be several: reshuffles undermine the legitimacy of the courts, 
making easier to concoct new attacks, they create highly partisan bodies, 
expanding the need for further purges when a new administration comes to 
office, and they ultimately establish, after several episodes, the informal ―right‖ 
of all rulers to control the judiciary.  
Legacies of judicial instability constitute a serious concern in much of 
Latin America. But these legacies are not inescapable, precisely because the two 
logics described above interact. If judicial turnover is subject to 
contemporaneous exogenous shocks as much as to past legacies, the overall risk 
confronted by judges will change with the political environment, and legacies 
may ultimately shift over the long run. Figure 4 plots the values of our twenty-
year measure for 18 countries between 1920 and 2010 (black bands reflect the 
range of legacies confronted by judges in supreme courts and constitutional 
tribunals, where both institutions exist). The trends show a secular improvement 
in the historical conditions for judges in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, and Paraguay. There is also some evidence of recent improvements in 
Argentina. But the legacies of judicial instability remain a heavy burden for high 
courts in Ecuador, and they offer alarming trends for the future in Bolivia, 
Honduras, Guatemala, and Venezuela. 
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Figure 4. Legacies of Judicial Instability in Eighteen Latin American Countries 
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